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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Unprecedented political violence spread in Kenya following the disputed December 
2007 General Election. The mediation by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan saw the two main 
parties – the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) – agree to undertake several actions to stop the violence and end the crisis.  
2. This is the fifth progress review report on the implementation of the actions developed 
under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) mediation agreements. 
Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. This report covers the period 
between October and December 2009.   
3. This report is based on data collected using interviews with key informants, and focus 
group discussions. A survey in the regions affected by the post-election violence, 
comprising a sample from Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), was also undertaken 
(Annex 1 contains the main findings – Situational Analysis of PEV areas, December 
2009). Additional information was collected through content analysis of secondary 
sources.  
Findings 
Insecurity 
4. Findings during the period between October and December 2009 once again point to 
security as an issue of concern in several parts of the country. The government has not 
effectively demobilised the various illegally armed groups. Some of these groups have 
transformed into criminal extortion gangs. They control enormous amounts of money 
through extortion rackets in several sectors of the economy, especially in poor urban 
areas – and some rural areas. The groups have carefully zoned spheres of control in the 
poor areas of the cities, where they extort money under the guise of providing security. 
Interestingly, some vigilante groups, though formed with good intentions of 
community policing, are also falling into the habit of demanding money to provide 
security. The failure of the police to eliminate these groups is spawning the expansion 
of their activities and growth of new and relatively unknown groups. The amount of 
money some of these groups control – through extortion – and relation with influential 
individuals has emboldened them to act with impunity. 
No Special Tribunal for Kenya  
5. The government has not established a Special Tribunal for Kenya to try perpetrators of 
the post-election violence. The failure and general inability of the Cabinet and 
Parliament to establish the tribunal are pointers to concerted and unified efforts by 
senior politicians to undermine the process of creating accountability with regard to 
post-election violence. The indecisiveness that senior leaders demonstrate on this 
matter is a pointer that politicians would rather have the matter swept under the carpet 
than be dealt with. The failure to act implies that victims will not get justice and 
perpetrators will not be punished. 
The International Criminal Court 
6. Kenyans are generally supportive of prosecution – including by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) -- of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the post-
election violence. Almost half of the population in the post-election violence areas say 
they will support the trials even if a senior member of their community is indicted for 
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perpetrating violence. Many are also supportive of ICC intervention because they 
believe there will be no justice for victims if the trials take place in the country. 
7. The possibility of ICC intervention has resulted in heightened intimidation, harassment 
and even murder of witnesses and human rights defenders. There are many potential 
witnesses and human rights defenders who have been threatened with death. Cases of 
murder have also been noted. Over 40 potential witnesses and/or human rights 
defenders have gone into hiding fearing for their lives. This, on its own, raises the need 
to establish a witness protection programme under the watch of the international 
community and human rights defenders rather than the government. 
Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees 
8. The problems affecting IDPs are far from over. Not all IDPs have gone back to the areas 
they were evicted from. Some continue to live in transition camps while others have 
bought small parcels of land where they have basic shelter. The resettlement 
programme itself has been assailed by allegations of corruption. Of concern, during this 
quarter, is that the purchase of land for a few select IDPs exemplified poor coordination 
and conflicts among the various ministries that have begun to show interest in this 
issue.  
9. In particular, the purchase of land to settle IDPs revealed poor inter-ministerial 
coordination and politicisation of the resettlement programme. It also revealed lack of 
mechanisms for accountability in the process: There are inter-ministerial conflicts over 
how land was identified for buying and giving to select IDPs. Allegations of corruption 
and discrimination in allocation of land to IDPs should be addressed. The National IDP 
Policy, due to be formulated by March 2010, should designate a clear institutional 
framework to address the IDP question.  
10. Some Kenyan refugees still remain in Uganda. The reluctance of Kenyan refugees to 
repatriate and continued existence of displaced persons are indicators that safe 
conditions in return areas have not been restored. There is need for more peace 
building in these areas and greater commitment to bring back the refugees. 
11. Healing and reconciliation between different communities have been taking place very 
slowly. Again, as mentioned in previous reports, approaches to healing and 
reconciliation have been haphazard and uncoordinated. They lack the political profiling 
to make them effective at the local level. The adoption and implementation of the 
National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Transformation should be expedited to 
consolidate and institutionalise the peace building agenda.  
Lack of cohesion and coherence in government 
12. The lack of coherence and cohesion within the Grand Coalition Government remains an 
unresolved problem and is a matter of great concern. Political factionalism within the 
individual parties has deepened these problems and resulted in creation of new ethnic 
alliances whose main motive is to promote and protect political interests of ethnic 
leaders and, at the same time, block critical reforms. Their opposition to accountability 
for prosecution of perpetrators of post-election violence and impunity in general is very 
apparent. This has resulted in individual interests subjugating national ones. To 
promote individual interests, politicians are increasingly turning to their ethnic 
constituencies and other parochial considerations. This has had the effect of 
undermining pursuance of national political and especially the KDNR goal: promoting 
peace, stability through the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
13. Both sides of the coalition posit different challenges to reforms. They 
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appreciate the challenges to reforms from very different standpoints. Although there 
have been regular consultations and meetings between the President and the Prime 
Minister, these have not translated into real cohesion within the government. Their 
allies who have vested interests in their party positions constantly undermine their 
agreements and fail to implement key decisions/agreements, especially if such 
decisions threaten the interests of dominant blocs and individuals in their parties 
and/or their side of the government.  
14. As a result, there is a great deal of agreement on numerous issues but very little action 
in that regard or the actions take place slowly. Because of this, it is doubtful that the 
two principals support each other in ensuring implementation of matters they agree 
upon. Suspicions and mistrust characterise relations between not only ministers, but 
also relations between some Permanent Secretaries and their ministers. In general, the 
government lacks cohesion and coherence at different levels. The rise of new political 
alliances formed along ethnic lines to promote personal interests is compounding this 
problem. 
No mechanism for resolving disputes 
15. There are no effective mechanisms for resolving internal disputes within the coalition; 
there is no structured mechanism for building consensus on important national issues. 
The Committee for the Management of the Grand Coalition Affairs has not been 
effective. Partly because of this and partly because of the need to resolve conflicts with 
ease, the parties should consider appointing the inter-parties technical team that 
facilitated the KNDR mediation to take charge of this role. 
The constitutional review process 
16. With regard to the constitutional review process, the Committee of Experts (CoE) has 
already published a new Harmonised Draft Constitution for discussion by the public 
and later by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC). However, divisions within the 
Grand Coalition Government and increased political factionalism make it difficult for 
the parties to develop consensus on a number of contentious issues. This may further 
delay the finalisation of the draft constitution. In the meantime, the term of the CoE is 
due to expire by the end of March 2010, or 12 months after the date they were sworn in. 
There is need, therefore, to extend the CoE’s term period beyond March 2010. 
17. As mentioned in the previous report, the constitutional review process can fail because 
of failure to carefully negotiate the vested interests around a Constitution. Political 
actors have different preferences, which cannot be resolved through public debates. 
The parties are yet to develop consensus on how to move forward. The differences 
between the parties are likely to delay the process and alienate citizens from the review 
process.  
 
18. Institutional reforms in the rest of the Agenda 4 areas have begun but the focus is on 
administrative aspects. The government must focus attention on broad policy and 
institutional changes because reforms are not about transferring individuals from one 
station to another. Neither are reforms only about organisational infrastructure. 
Reforms are about change in policy and about transformation of institution and 
behaviour. The proposals in the Harmonised Draft Constitution present an important 
opportunity to regenerate the reform momentum. 
Conclusion 
19. The new political dynamics clearly pose a danger to reforms that the country has been 
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trying to undertake. These individual interests and the new alliances have deflected 
attention away from reforms. The small window that has remained open risks closing 
prematurely. The constitutional review process, however, has created new hope and 
will probably create a solid space for Kenyans to begin rebuilding institutions.  
20. The review process, therefore, must be insulated from these parochial interests. There 
is need for a coalition of interests across parties and within the broader civil society to 
protect the review process and ensure that it does not stall. The new alliances that are 
emerging and their campaign for 2012 could close the only small window that was 
remaining to enable the government to make decisions. Political expediency and the 
personal interests of leaders, rather than national interests, appear to be guiding major 
events in the country. The constitution review remains the main opportunity for 
rekindling hope for the nation’s future. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Kenya experienced unprecedented violent conflict following the disputed December 2007 
General Election. The mediation by the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities under the chairmanship of Mr Kofi Annan resulted in the two main parties 
– the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) – agreeing 
on a number of steps to address the crisis. 
2. Under the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) forum, the parties 
signed the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ on 
28 February 2008. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 was enacted 
soon after.  
3. The parties committed to undertake a set of actions to achieve the goal of the KNDR: 
Achieving sustainable peace, stability and justice through rule of law and respect for 
human rights. 
4. This report is the fifth review of progress in implementing the Kenya National Dialogue 
and Reconciliation agreements. Previous reports are found at www.dialoguekenya.org. 
This report covers the period between October and December 2009.   
5. The report has been developed from data collected using several methods. The research 
team interviewed various respondents with knowledge on the various agenda items. In 
addition, a survey on the prevailing situation in the regions affected by the post-election 
violence was carried out. The survey comprised a significant sample size of IDPs.  
6. The report has also relied on secondary sources of information, including reports by the 
government, humanitarian agencies as well as the media. Secondary sources, however, 
have been integrated into the report with caution: corroboration through primary data 
sources has informed the extent to which some of the findings are integrated into the 
review. Once again, the review has taken care to remain objective and to let the data 
speak for itself, knowing too well that analysing progress is sensitive to personal vested 
interests and political realities. 
7. The report is divided into sections corresponding to the agenda items under the KNDR 
agreement.  
(a) Section II:  Agenda Item 1 on actions to end violence and restore fundamental 
rights.  
(b) Section III: Agenda Item 2 – Addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting 
healing and reconciliation.  
(c) Section IV discusses Agenda Item 3 on power sharing, which was agreed upon as 
a means of ending the political crisis.  
(d) Section V discusses Agenda Item 4 on addressing long-standing issues.  
(e) Section VI: Some conclusions based on the main findings on each agenda item. 
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2  AGENDA ITEM 1: IMMEDIATE ACTION TO STOP VIOLENCE AND 
RESTORE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
Introduction 
8. Agenda 1 of the KNDR sought to immediately end the post-election violence and restore 
fundamental rights and liberties. The previous reports noted that post-election violence 
ended in all affected areas and relative calm obtained? after the two parties agreed to 
form a Coalition Government in  February 2008.  
9. Findings from early 2009 have repeatedly shown that there is calm in many areas and 
that over half of the population is confident that violence will not recur. This optimism 
obtained? during the last quarter of 2009. The progress made towards getting a new 
Constitution continued to reinforce this optimism.  
10. This quarterly report for the period between October and December 2009 examines the 
status of security and why it is deteriorating. The report pays special attention to 
security. This is because previous reports showed that security was deteriorating in 
different parts of the country and that illegal groups were very much in place. 
Key findings 
Summary  
• Illegal groups multiply, collect money through extortion rackets; all forms of 
crime increase. 
• Resource-based conflicts and cattle-rustling escalate in Northern Kenya districts, 
National Steering Committee organises a retreat to discuss insecurity.  
• Apparent inter-departmental incoherence and general institutional failure 
prevent government from curbing insecurity. 
• International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor’s interest in the Kenya situation 
attracts threats against witnesses in post-election violence cases; no progress 
made in ensuring justice for PEV victims. 
• Little progress made to establish a Special Tribunal and in the fight against 
impunity despite international pressure. 
 
The Deteriorating Security Situation 
11. The previous review of progress paid particular attention to the deteriorating security 
situation in the country. The reports noted that the post-election violence was halted 
after the parties signed the agreement and formed the Coalition Government. However, 
new forms of crime, such as extortion, emerged to take the place of the political violence. 
Illegal armed groups proliferated and acted with impunity. Resource-based conflicts in 
different parts of the country increased in tandem with deepening drought in pastoral 
areas. More people were feeling unsafe toward the beginning of the last quarter of 2009.     
12. The reports noted that it is difficult to disband illegal groups because they enjoy the 
support of some political leaders and sustain themselves through criminal activities. 
Also, the police lack adequate capacity to deal with them. Lack of policy guidelines also 
makes it difficult to eradicate these groups. Further, victims of crime do not provide 
evidence to sustain prosecutions. Complicity by police officers was also highlighted as a 
major obstacle to the elimination of these groups. Failure to effectively address 
challenges has resulted in illegal groups conducting their activities with impunity and, in 
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some instances, threatening security officials.2  
13. Findings in this quarter reveal three aspects of these groups and insecurity that appear to 
be interrelated. One, community policing through vigilantes is turning into a source of 
insecurity for communities. Two, illegal groups as well as vigilantes demand payment for 
security in poor neighbourhoods. Three, illegal groups have transformed into extortion 
gangs; they control millions of shillings in revenue from extortion and other criminal 
activities and investments. These three interrelated trends are discussed below. 
Illegal groups ‘providing security’ 
14. Field data show that gangs have flourished under the guise of ‘providing security.’ 
Vigilantes are also transforming into gangs and their activities are not different from 
those of illegal armed militia. They kill suspects or torture them. The manner in which 
some of them conduct their activities has distorted the meaning and practice of 
community policing.   
15. The rise of vigilantism has led to an increase in crime levels in some areas. Vigilantism as 
a deterrence strategy in Nairobi and Central provinces has failed to fill the security gap. 
Combined with the police failure to deal with insecurity, this has led people to employ 
extreme forms of violence against suspects. Tacit official recognition of this flawed form 
of community policing is undermining the rule of law and making violence against 
victims look normal or acceptable to the society. It is gradually leading to a situation 
where people accept these informal groups in the society thereby leading to compliance 
and allegiance to the gangs. People in some areas now tend to see the police as slow, 
inept, corrupt and unlikely to convict criminals or deliver justice to victims.  
16. As noted in the report of the taskforce on police reforms and during the field survey for 
this quarter, the police force’s capacity for rapid response is hindered by communication 
and logistical challenges such as lack of vehicles, fuel and impassable roads. Police 
stations are understaffed and lack equipment. Allegedly, senior officers take money 
allocated for telephone communication away without accounting for it.3 People complain 
of police failures in assisting them: ‘If you go to the police, they ask you to buy fuel for 
them to travel to the crime scene, or they ask you for airtime to call their seniors. Other 
times they tell you they will come to investigate but they don’t come. Most of the times, 
nothing is done or the criminals are set free for lack of evidence.’4  
17. These operational challenges suggest again the need to fast-track radical policy and 
institutional changes within the security sector in its entirety. Urgency is required 
because the country is approaching important political watersheds: a possible 
referendum on a new Constitution; and intensification of campaigns for the 2012 General 
Election. The security sector ought to be fully and urgently transformed to act in line with 
the KNDR goal: promote peace, stability and justice through rule of law and respect for 
human rights. 
Security on sale 
18. Security has been commoditised. The government and communities designed 
community policing as a voluntary, self-help initiative by neighbourhood members but 
self-styled vigilantes have turned it into a commodity for sale. Individuals, households 
and businesses pay for personal safety and protection of property. Vigilantes, organised 
as security units, attack or destroy the property of individuals or households that are 
unwilling to pay. 
19. In the poor areas of Nairobi, these groups have advanced their extortion rackets to all 
sectors of the economy. Tenants and landlords pay varying amounts of money to these 
                                                 
2
 Interviews with security officers in Kibera, Kayole and Dandora in Nairobi, October and November 2009  
3 Interview with a police officer in Eldoret, 8 October  2009 
4
 Interview in Kibera, 29 October 2009 
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groups. Residential houses or businesses located in better-off neighbourhoods pay more. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of corroborating such information, field data indicates 
that the illegal fees charged for protection vary from one neighbourhood to another and 
from one type and size of business to another. 
20. These forms of extortion stifle investment. Indeed, many businesses are unable to cope.5 
Conversely, extortion has become attractive as a source of income for the unemployed 
youth in urban areas. This has implications for the organisation of economic activities at 
the local level. 
Extortion gangs and the economy 
21.  The September 2009 review report noted that political ‘goons for hire’ had mutated into 
organised criminal gangs. The findings show that the groups have turned into extortion 
gangs. In addition to the transport sector, extortion gangs have also permeated the 
building and construction industry (targeting developers, quarries and transporters), 
residential estates, businesses and markets. In Nairobi slums, new investors in the public 
transport sector have to pay huge sums of money (Ksh50,000) to be allowed to operate 
on certain routes. 
Table 1: Illegal taxation of public transport vehicles in Kibera and Eastlands 
 
Vehicle 
type 
Extortion gang/ amount per day (Ksh) in Kibera  
Total per/ 
day (Ksh) 
Labour 
Youth 
Bumps 
Ahead 
Karanja 
Youth 
Olympic  Kaberenge  
Matatu  50 50 50 100 30 280 
Bus  100 100 50 100 50 400 
Mungiki/ amount per day (Ksh) in Eastlands6 
 Kayole  Mathare Dandora     
Matatu 300 400 500    
Mini 
bus 
600 500 1000    
Source: Field data, November/December 2009 
22. Extortion rackets in the public transport industry have a huge impact on the national 
economy. On the basis of estimates by those in the transport industry, the amount of 
money lost to criminal gangs through extortion is quite significant. According to 
estimates by the Matatu Owners Association, the 15,000 public service vehicles, in 
Nairobi and environs, lose Ksh10.5 million per day to extortion rackets. This amount, 
collected from only one sector in one province, translates into about Ksh3.5 billion per 
year.  
23. The illegal groups are adding new services to their ‘security’ role. They are involved in 
solving disputes at the community and family level. They are slowly seeking to legitimise 
themselves by providing certain services that the state is not providing. One person 
noted, for example, ‘If your wife reports that you beat her or misuse money without 
providing for the family, they look for you and give you a thorough beating. You 
continue to pay fines until your wife reports that you have reformed!’7   
24.  Tens of extortion gangs have emerged and diversified their targets and areas of 
operation. Field data in informal settlements in Nairobi, Central and Nyanza provinces 
                                                 
5
 Informal interview with a matatu driver, Eastleigh, where a vehicle was burnt in August 2009 when the crew 
refused to remit illegal taxes. 
6
 Mungiki has monopolised public transport in Eastlands; other groups such as ‘Wailer’, ‘Thaai’ and ‘Taliban’ 
focus on ‘security’, solving disputes and the building and construction industry. 
7
 Interview with a woman in Kibera, 29 October 2009 
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indicate that in addition to older illegal groups such as Mungiki, Taliban, Bukhungu, 
Baghdad and Kamjesh, new groups with similar tactics have emerged. 
25. The media and the public have focused on Mungiki and other well-known groups. This 
has made it easy for the new groups to deepen their extortion activities. In Kibera, for 
instance, new groups collect illegal taxes from public transport vehicles at designated 
points along the road. Those unwilling to pay are banned from plying the route. The table 
below shows common names used by these groups. 
Table 2: New Illegal Groups in Urban Informal Settlements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Field data, October/November 2009 
26. The previous review of progress reports observed that the government had not 
successfully disbanded illegal groups because of lack of political will and police lacking 
the capacity for the task. During this quarter, findings show that politically organised 
armed militia are not in place in a manner similar to the early 2008 period. As argued in 
the past, the groups have mutated into criminal gangs or are simply idle because there 
are no “political jobs”. Many people now attest that there are no such groups in their 
area. This is indicative of a situation in which there are no groups financed to do political 
battles. Our survey showed that many respondents did not know of armed groups in their 
area. 
Figure1: To your knowledge, have local armed groups been completely disbanded or 
demobilised in your area? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nairobi West (Kibera) Nairobi 
North  
Central  Nyanza 
Yes We Can  Dego Youths  Thaai The Hague Nyalenda Base 
Siafu 40 Ndugus Wailer Kenda Kenda The Chief Squad 
Haki Yetu Bumps Ahead  Bantu Nyamasaria Massive 
14 Gendarmerie Kaberenge Youth  Ngoroko Baghdad for Peace 
12 Flamingos ODM Youths   Karamojong Boys 
12 Disciples Karanja Youths   Saba Saba 
Bunkers  Darajani    Artur Margaryan  
Kosovo Jipange   Kebago 
Tuff Gong Super 14    
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27. The view that politicians finance these groups has not changed. Asked who they thought 
supported these groups, 47 per cent of the respondents named the politicians. In 
February 2009, close to 40 per cent of the respondents had again identified politicians as 
the financiers of illegally armed groups. Business people finance these groups, too, with 
23 per cent of Internally Displaced Persons sample naming them for providing such 
support. 
Table 3: In your opinion, who do you think finances armed groups? 
(November/December 2009) 
 
 Total IDP General 
Politicians  46% 42% 47% 
Business people  17% 23% 15% 
Self financing by 
groups  
15% 17% 15% 
Don't know  12% 13% 11% 
Ordinary citizens  4% 2% 5% 
Community elders  3% 3% 4% 
Government  2% 0% 2% 
None  1% 0% 1% 
 
28. Asked what the best way to disband these groups is, 33 per cent of the respondents would 
prefer prosecution of their leaders while 25 per cent would support the creation of 
employment for the youth. 
Figure 2: What is the best way to disband illegal groups? 
 
 
 
29. These responses suggest an increase in the importance the public attaches to prosecuting 
the leaders of illegal groups and those involved in financing their operations. During field 
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surveys, respondents have often emphasised the importance of prosecution of politicians 
and business people who finance the groups alongside the leaders of these groups as an 
important measure of ending violence. These responses suggest the need for urgency in 
prosecuting those involved in the post-election violence.. 
Security and Impunity 
Increasing threats against witnesses  
30. A point to stress is that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) visited 
Kenya in early November 2009 to seek State referral of the Kenyan situation. Following 
the visit, security for potential witnesses has become a matter of great concern. Many 
have been warned against giving information to any investigative body or even the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission.8  Several people, including an MP and human 
rights defenders, have received death threats.9 Over 40 potential witnesses and human 
rights defenders have gone into hiding. Some have disappeared. Others have been 
killed.10 Some senior politicians are believed to be behind these threats and 
intimidation.11 In Rift Valley Province, local radio stations have begun broadcasting 
inflammatory statements against the prosecution of post-election violence suspects.12 
31. Continued intimidation of potential witnesses and human rights defenders continues to 
raise concern. Absence of an effective witness protection mechanism implies even more 
challenges for witnesses. This raises a need to expedite the process of investigation and 
prosecution of perpetrators of the violence. It also raises the need to speed up 
establishing of a functional witness protection programme.  
32. In spite of these threats, the public is generally supportive of prosecution of those behind 
the post-election violence. Less than 5 per cent would resort to violent acts against 
members of other communities if those prosecuted came from their communities. 
Figure 3: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election 
violence, how will you personally react? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. These responses suggest that prosecution of those who incited post-election violence is 
unlikely to trigger violence and impunity. On their own, ordinary citizens would want to 
see an end to the culture of political violence. They prefer trials, including those of their 
own leaders.  
                                                 
8
 Interview with a victim of the post-election violence in Eldoret, 4 October, 2009 
9
 The Star, 25 November 2009, ‘Imanyara gets extra security’ 
10
 The Standard, 7 December 2009, ‘Activists seek funds to protect PEV witness’ 
11 The Star, 18 November 2009, ‘Politicians intimidating poll violence witness’ 
12
 Daily Nation, 4 November 2009, ‘Ban FM Stations fanning ethnicity’, says activist.  
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34. Indeed, as many as 62 per cent of the people in the areas affected by post-election 
violence think violence will not recur over the next 12 months. And if violence were to 
occur, 48 per cent say their communities will organise themselves for self-defence. This 
again implies that violence would assume ethnic dimension. Only 13 per cent would 
support peace and reconciliation efforts. Another 17 per cent of the respondents say they 
do not know what they would do while only 14 per cent would seek security from the 
police. Interestingly, 26 per cent of IDPs say they would not know what to do, and only 12 
per cent of them would report to the authorities. 
35. These responses are worrisome because ‘self-defence’ implies willingness to fight back or 
even to undertake retaliatory measures in the event of one being attacked. The violence 
would be ethnic. Inaction against the perpetrators of violence could be contributing to 
these feelings. If action had been taken, the public would be confident that the 
government would act. 
State failures in ending impunity 
36. Both Parliament and the Cabinet have failed to establish a Special Tribunal for Kenya to 
try those involved in the post-election violence. This failure is indicative of united efforts 
by a group of senior and influential politicians to sweep under the carpet matters to do 
with post-election violence. There is scant attention to justice for the victims.  
37. A Cabinet that has failed to provide a clear direction on the matter and a Parliament that 
is divided on the issue are only indicative of the numerous hurdles likely to emerge for 
the ICC intervention. It is possible that this unity by senior politicians against a Special 
Tribunal will again be reinforced to counter the ICC intervention. 
38. But the general population, including IDPs, supports ICC intervention. Over half of the 
population would prefer ICC to intervene, with 80 per cent of IDPs also preferring the 
ICC to the Special Tribunal. 
Table 4: Should those individuals responsible for post-election violence be tried 
through a local tribunal/ international community in The Hague or both? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. The international community has sustained pressure on Kenya to end impunity and 
expedite reforms. In October 2009, the United States imposed a visa ban on the Attorney 
General and said three other individuals would also be banned from entering the US. The 
move was supported by several other foreign missions in Nairobi.  
40. The entry of the ICC has altered the political landscape: politicians from the Kalenjin and 
Kikuyu communities have emerged as the principal voices in discourses on post-election 
violence perpetrators. The debate, on whether to punish the perpetrators or not, has 
transformed into an early political campaign and positioning for 2012. Politicians have 
delved into self-preservation strategies by mobilising ethnic sentiments and voicing 
threats of violence. They are mobilising communities to advance their interests in the 
hope that they can thus protect their personal political interests and careers in the name 
Place of trial % respondent 
 Total IDP General Sample 
Local tribunal 19% 6% 22% 
ICC/Hague 63% 80% 57% 
Both local tribunal and the 
ICC/Hague 5% 5% 5% 
Shouldn't be tried 10% 6% 11% 
DK 4% 3% 4% 
RTA 0% 0% 0% 
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of their ethnic communities. These dynamics may hamper the effectiveness of the ICC 
intervention in the fight against impunity.  
New forms of violence: Conflicts over resources and boundaries 
41. During the reporting period, conflicts over water and pasture and cattle rustling had 
escalated in the pastoral areas. Dialogue and traditional peace methods appear to be 
ineffective because of politicisation of traditional dispute resolution structures and use of 
modern weapons.   
42. According to statistics compiled by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) in Kenya, over 350 people have been killed in pastoral areas in 2009. 
Violent clashes in Isiolo, Tana River and the Suguta Valley in North Rift escalated.  
 
Figure 4: Killings in Pastoral Areas  
 
 
43. The conflict map below shows the various forms of conflict in the country during 2009. 
In particular, the map shows that resource-based conflicts (over water, pasture and land) 
and illegal groups are the main source of insecurity in the country.  
